Knock, knock, it's the new world order
- Martha Elias
- Sep 18
- 5 min read
On August 31 and September 1, Tianjin was the backdrop of the 25th annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The summit conveyed a clear message of reshaping the global framework of governance. If we had not felt the world order of the last few decades shift yet, we are now. China hosted the summit and has implicitly positioned itself as the leader in presenting an alternative to the American-led world order. This world order is shaped by security alliances, great U.S. influence in the financial and political world and sovereignty that is sometimes overridden by external powers. It favors American interests and therefore has more negotiating power, military capabilities and a network of allies that work to contribute to those interests. China has seen an opportunity for it to offer an alternative to this global order, one led, financed and influenced by China.
In the days following the SCO summit, coverage has partly been leaning towards skepticism about the potential of such a world order even being possible to realise. This skepticism is not entirely misplaced. The SCO consists of nine, mostly central Asian, states and votes by consensus. These two factors alone make it a less threatening entity to NATO and the EU. In addition, SCO does not mandate a commitment to mutual assistance. This makes it difficult to take action. The organization therefore holds most value as a forum for debates about its Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). Herein the main security threats the organization faces are terrorism, separatism and extremism.
While China is among the world's greatest economies and has extensive political power, it is frequently confronted with domestic and international trouble that can be categorized as one of the three threats SCO as a whole focuses on. This has in turn led to increased centralization of authority by the Chinese government domestically and has resulted in repression of ethnic minorities, critics and human rights organizations.
For China, hosting the summit is not just symbolically conveying a message, the hosting city Tianjin was the scene where several unequal treaties were signed in 1858.
Two days after the summit, the symbolism continued as the military parade was held on September 3. Marking the 80th anniversary of China’s Victory Day, it did not only celebrate the end of the Sino-Japanese war but it also highlighted China’s military capabilities. The first week of September 2025 was representative of changing attitudes in geopolitics. It showed that India, China and Russia though differing in interests were showing unity in favor of a multipolar world order.
China presents its ambitions of working towards a multipolarity as an alternative to the world order of the past few decades. It is clear this multipolarity is to take up its place in the current world order that is American-led. This also adds to the significance of this year’s SCO summit. The geopolitical climate is always a web of tensions but now with even more strained relations as a result of the United States’ current political course. This makes the message this summit sent out all the more clearer: the SCO is a platform through which China aims to take a “stance against hegemonism”.
The presentation of a united front by the leaders of 26,3% of the world's population in their advocacy for a changed world order offers an alternative to American hegemony. The show of unity at the summit can also be read as an answer to American pressure urging China and India to reduce their imports of Russian oil and gas. China has had multiple initiatives that aim to reach the goal of a multipolar world order. Its Global Governance Initiative (GGI) urges for “development and reform of the global governance system”. These are mainly dominated by the U.S. and its allied states. Through BRICS it also advocated for a New Development Bank, which could effectively serve as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank. These latter two institutions have for long been criticized to be disproportionately influenced by the great share of American and European votes. Another channel through which China has emphasized these ambitions is the Belt and Road Initiative. It has offered financial, logistical and political infrastructures in nearly every continent. It is clear that China has been building towards a new and China-oriented world order.
Russia has been fighting pressures on all sides. Its invasion of Ukraine has cost it hundreds of billions in USD and over 250.000 soldiers. War fatigue seems to catch up with Russia more than it is willing to admit. In addition, Russia is also suffering from Ukrainian attacks on energy facilities. On its other borders it faced pressures, too. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), aimed at politico-military cooperation and national and collective security failed in its raison d’etre. The organization lost much of its credibility during Azerbaijan’s offensive on Armenia in 2023. Russia’s inaction showed the CSTO was not an effort worth pursuing for Putin.
Russia is using the SCO summit as an opportunity to present itself towards Europe and America with a message; it is not alone on the world stage despite sanctions and condemnations. This message does not translate to the battlefield as Russian drones’ presence on Polish territory on September 10 Poland triggered NATO’s article 4. In this light it becomes increasingly evident, Russia is in desperate need of allies as Europe is preparing for military impact being felt on its eastern flank.
India was the third key player at this year’s summit. The presence of Prime Minister Modi highlighted changing attitudes in relations between China and India. For the first time in seven years the Indian head of state made a visit to China. Sino-Indian relations have been experiencing pressure for years now, in part due to contrasting opinions on a range of topics from the One-China Policy to the debate on Tibetan statehood and Sino-Pakistani relations. Against the backdrop of U.S. imposed tariffs, India had used the summit as an opportunity to show it will be preserving its ambiguous position between the United States and China. India has been able to uniquely position itself as a friend to all, becoming a counterweight to China’s influence in Asia. India’s participation is also valuable to Russia as it allows for more counterweight to China within the SCO and thus multipolarity.
China can relate to the pressure felt by India as a result of tariffs, but counters it by affirming its ambitions of reshaping the structures that allow for this pressure. The tariffs have urged the three states to move closer to one another.
Even if SCO, BRICS or the Belt and Road Initiative have not caused major international diversion from an American-led world order, it is clear that these states desire and work towards it. Therefore the possible consequences of its success should be enough for the United States and its allies to seriously reconsider its position in the global order and how it may change in the near future.
Sources:
Aljazeera, ’China, Russia pledge new global order at Shanghai Cooperation summit’, 2 September 2025.
Bao, Anniek, ‘SCO summit 2025: Key takeaways from Beijing’s push to reshape global order’, September 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/02/sco-summit-2025-key-takeaways.html
Bardhann, Ashok, ‘Decoding the SCO Summit: The Changing World Order Gathers Momentum’, 10 September 2025.
G. Jones, Seth and McCabe, Riley, ‘Russia’s Battlefield Woes in Ukraine’, 3 June 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukraine
Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2025, events of 2004’, January 2025. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/china
Kent, Lauren, ‘After Russian drones were downed in Poland, what does triggering NATO Article 4 mean?’, 11 September 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/11/europe/nato-article-four-poland-drones-intl
J. Shatz, Howard and Reach, Clint, The Cost of the Ukraine War for Russia’’, 18 December 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2421-1.html
Jaura, Ramesh, ‘SCO Summit 2025: Eurasia’s Laboratory Of Contradictions – Analysis’, 9 September 2025. https://www.eurasiareview.com/09092025-sco-summit-2025-eurasias-laboratory-of-contradictions-analysis/
Levin, Henrietta, China Showcases Global Ambitions at Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit’’, 3 September 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-showcases-global-ambitions-shanghai-cooperation-organization-summit
Saini, Ayushi, ‘India in SCO: A part of Russia’s Greater Eurasian dream?’ 11 July 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-in-sco-a-part-of-russia-s-greater-eurasian-dream?
Tunagur, Enes, ‘Oil rises as investors assess attacks on Russian energy facilities’, 15 September 2025.
Verberg, Gabi, ‘Grote veiligheidstop in China: waarschijnlijk veel symboliek, weinig plannen’, 30 August 2025. https://nos.nl/artikel/2580473-grote-veiligheidstop-in-china-waarschijnlijk-veel-symboliek-weinig-plannen
Visual sources:
Comments