Nuclear Nostalgia: Why Small States Are Dreaming of the Bomb Again

By: Anna Campelo

When the atomic bomb was initially dropped on Hiroshima, followed three days later by a second bombing on Nagasaki, back in 1945, the world witnessed not only destruction but the emergence of a new order. Nuclear power was now the ultimate currency of sovereignty — an insurance for regimes, a shortcut to status, and, paradoxically, an emblem of "rational deterrence." For decades, this privilege seemed reserved for an exclusive club. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty offered a deal: the nuclear powers would one day disband their arsenals, and the rest of the world committed not to pursue them. It was the fragile architecture of a bipolar era, where fear itself was stabilizing.

The mushroom cloud rising over Hiroshima after the detonation of ‘Little Boy,’ 1945 — marking the dawn of the nuclear age. (Source: U.S. Army via National Archives and Records Administration - NARA)

and medium-sized states are quietly reconsidering what the atom can do for them. From Saudi Arabia's subtle nuclear advances to Uzbekistan's civilian power ambitions, from Iran's enrichment milestones to Kazakhstan's growing anxiety, a subtle but revealing pattern emerges: the re-emergence of nuclear temptation as an insurance policy against geopolitical exposure.

In the wake of the Soviet implosion, it was believed by many that nuclear disarmament had triumphed as a moral as well as strategic consensus. South Africa dismantled its secret arsenal, and Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus gave up the inherited warheads. Optimism after the Cold War relied on the belief that interdependence and globalization would replace deterrence with diplomacy. History, nevertheless, has not been kind to optimism. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 sent a sobering message: regimes without nuclear deterrence could be overthrown at whim. In geopolitical terms, non-proliferation had become a luxury of the secure.

The lesson was not lost on the global periphery. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs argue in The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation, lesser states will pursue nuclear programs not out of expansionism, but because they are existentially threatened. Possessing (or at least approaching) the nuclear threshold is then a tool of strategic ambiguity, a deterrent without announcement. Iran's insistence that its program is civilian fits precisely this logic: by enriching uranium to 60%, Tehran is showing both defiance and deterrence. Saudi Arabia, on its part, proposes to pursue nuclear energy "to match any regional rival," and Uzbekistan's cooperation with Russia to construct small modular reactors is another dimension, nuclear energy as a symbol of technological modernity and geopolitical sovereignty.

In Central Asia, this trend suggests the ongoing shadow of empire. Post-Soviet states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan balance their relations between Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, each of which offers different forms of strategic partnership. By seeking nuclear cooperation, these states demonstrate their ability to engage directly with great powers, exercising agency within the multipolar order. For Russia, supporting such projects serves its own interests: export of technology, creation of dependency, and extension of influence through nuclear diplomacy rather than force.

This shift mirrors what most analysts now call the post-hegemonic order, an order no longer supported by one superpower but by competitive pluralism. In this situation, small and medium powers hedge their bets. They diversify alliances, seek dual-use technologies, and create "strategic latency": the technical ability to go nuclear if necessary, but not yet. The distinction between civilian and military capability is deliberately blurred.

The implications are extensive. For one, the moral authority of the non-proliferation order is eroding. The NPT deal, that the nuclear powers would disarm, has been repeatedly betrayed, whether by US modernization plans or Russian nuclear saber-rattling in the war in Ukraine. Under such conditions, appeals to restraint ring hollow. As one Kazakh analyst observed, "We gave up our weapons for a promise that was never kept." That frustration resonates across the Global South, where nuclear equality has become another front of postcolonial grievance.

The NPT's Fragile Architecture. The map reveals the nuclear-armed nations operating outside the Treaty regime (in red and black), visually demonstrating the erosion of legal commitments in favor of atomic possession as the ultimate security guarantee. (Source: FNSP - Sciences Po / Atelier de cartographie, 2018.)

Second, the emergence of middle powers like Turkey, India, Brazil, and South Africa adds to the complexity of enforcement. These states eschew the nuclear/non-nuclear binary in favor of a third way, technological sovereignty, regional power, and political clout. The result is not a new Cold War, but a kaleidoscope of deterrence: diffuse, asymmetric, and ever more unpredictable.

Now, nuclear aspiration today coincides with energy security and climate politics. Energy crises, rare earth competition, and the decarbonization race all reinforce a new logic of autonomy. Nuclear energy (especially through small modular reactors) is repackaged today as green and viable. But as history shows, civilian programs can morph into military capability faster than international institutions can react.

The International Atomic Energy Agency still has a crucial monitoring role, but institutions built for a bipolar world are not well suited to manage a multipolar one. As the agency itself pointed out in its 2025 report, the rules-based system depends not only on treaties but on trust. And trust, in this geopolitical landscape, is the most elusive commodity of all.

Last, the revived nuclear appeal to small states will be driven more by fear than by ambition. It will be a testament to a world where security guarantees are conditional, norms are applied selectively, and power has decentralized and gone performative. The atom, once tamed by treaties and moral restraint, is quietly being reimagined, not as a tool of Armageddon, but as the ultimate vocabulary of sovereignty in a fragmented international order.

References

• Monteiro, Nuno P., and Alexandre Debs. The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2014.

• International Atomic Energy Agency. Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors. March 2025.

• Iranian President Denies Nuclear Weapons Ambitions After UN Alarm on Uranium Enrichment. People’s Daily, September 2024.

• Saudi Arabia Plans to Allow Tougher Nuclear Oversight by IAEA This Year. VOA News, September 2024.

• Uzbekistan and Russia to Start Construction of Small Nuclear Power Plants. The Diplomat, May 2024.

• Back to the Future? Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Choice. United States Institute of Peace, October 2024.