The Gambit of the Gaza Strip: Why the US-Backed UN Resolution Is a Trap, Not a Truce

Written By: Anna Campelo

The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on 17 November 2025, which endorses a US-backed plan to establish an international framework for stabilizing the Gaza Strip, represents one of the most significant diplomatic developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years. Publicly, the resolution is presented as a step toward easing tensions and enabling reconstruction. Yet, it introduces a temporary governance and security system whose long-term trajectory remains uncertain. Terms such as peace, stabilization, and civilian protection suggest broad consensus, but the operational details leave critical questions unanswered. Instead of pointing to a clear political horizon, the resolution risks placing Palestinian self-determination in the hands of external actors whose authority, scope, and timelines are neither fully defined nor constrained. Who, ultimately, will decide the future of Gaza?

A particularly controversial feature of Resolution 2803 is the creation of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and its accompanying Board of Peace (BoP). Unlike traditional UN peacekeeping missions, which are neutral and collectively managed, this structure concentrates decision-making power with the United States and select regional partners while maintaining the legitimacy of a UN mandate. Analysts at Chatham House have warned that this hybrid model may blur the line between multilateral oversight and strategic alignment. Regional partners often prioritize short-term security or counter-extremism goals over long-term political reconstruction. Although the resolution does not propose a permanent ISF presence, it lacks clear exit criteria or predefined timelines. Historical precedents, such as the extended UN missions in Lebanon in 2006 and Kosovo from 1999 to 2008, suggest that such missions can persist for years, producing long-lasting political and social consequences.

The political design of the resolution adds further complexity. While reaffirming support for a two-state solution, it ties progress toward Palestinian self-governance to reforms within the Palestinian Authority deemed “credible and effective.” The resolution does not define what qualifies as credible or effective, nor who evaluates it. This vagueness could allow transitional periods in which Palestinian sovereignty depends on evolving and potentially arbitrary standards set by external actors. Conditionality does not preclude eventual statehood, but it introduces significant uncertainty about timing, structure, and legitimacy, particularly if disagreements among external actors or worsening security conditions delay progress.

Focusing solely on Gaza also has territorial implications. The resolution does not explicitly integrate the West Bank or East Jerusalem, raising concerns that isolated stabilization could reinforce fragmentation within Palestinian territories. Legal scholars have warned that without mechanisms ensuring coherence across Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, efforts to build a unified Palestinian state may be undermined. How entrenched this segmentation becomes will depend largely on BoP operations and whether international and regional actors coordinate across all Palestinian territories.

Humanitarian concerns, though emphasized in public statements, appear secondary to security priorities in operational design. The ISF mandate emphasizes disarmament, movement restrictions, and enforcement, while humanitarian aid and reconstruction remain under BoP oversight. There is a real risk that aid distribution, rebuilding projects, and economic recovery could be delayed if security disagreements dominate decision-making. Past interventions, such as the temporary UN-administered authority in southern Lebanon in 2006, illustrate how security-focused missions can unintentionally stall reconstruction and civilian support efforts.

Ultimately, Resolution 2803 signals a turning point in international approaches to Gaza. It marks a shift from traditional multilateral peacekeeping toward a model where stabilization is closely tied to external supervision and conditional progress. While the resolution does not explicitly undermine Palestinian aspirations for statehood, it creates the potential for a long and uncertain transitional period with unpredictable political consequences. Sustained global attention, full transparency, accountability, and a firm commitment to Palestinian rights are essential to ensure that this framework contributes to a just and lasting solution. Are international actors prepared to meet these standards, or is Gaza on the verge of another protracted period of dependency?

References

•United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2803 (S/RES/2803). UN Digital Library, 2025.

•International Crisis Group. Gaza’s Ceasefire Is Vital, but Only a Start (Middle East Briefing B97).

•Brookings Institution. What could the Israel–Gaza deal mean for the Middle East? Brookings analysis.

•Chatham House. Fragmentation of Palestinian Territories and Its Legal Implications. Middle East & North Africa Programme, 2024.

•Middle East Institute (MEI). An International Stabilization Force for Gaza.

•Human Rights Watch. World Report 2025 – Israel/Palestine

•Al Jazeera. UN Security Council passes US resolution mandating international stabilization force in Gaza.

•The Washington Post. The US plan for Gaza won UN backing. Carrying it out could be far more difficult.

•The Foreign Affairs Interview, podcast. America’s Two-State Delusion.

•ABC News. UN Security Council backs US plan for Gaza.

•Euronews / AP. UN Security Council approves Trump’s Gaza plan for international force

•Chatham House. What is Security Council Resolution 2803, and what does it mean for the Trump Gaza plan?